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instant case. In a Pennsylvania case,' 7 the plaintiff's husband was
inserting a twenty-one foot pipe into a well, when the pipe came into
contact with electric wires ten and one-half feet above his head. The
wires were not insulated, but they were blackened by the weather so
as to give the appearance of being insulated. In upholding a verdict
for the plaintiff, the court said: "not possibly could the court have
declared him to have been at fault as a matter of law."18 Likewise a
verdict for the plaintiff was upheld in a Washington case,'9 where the
plaintiff's husband was holding a twenty-five foot television antenna
which came in contact with an overhead wire and electrocuted him.
The court felt that the question of whether the wires should have
been a warning of danger to a reasonably prudent and cautious man
was for the jury to decide.
These two cases represent the better view, inasmuch as there is a
decided preference for allowing the question of contributory negligence
to go to the jury. It should then follow that the dissenting judges were
correct: the appellant's actions would indeed permit a reasonable mind
to reach a conclusion other than that he was contributorily negligent.
While a jury may deny Goetz recovery by reason of contributory
negligence, it is not the Court's job to arrive at a similar finding of
fact. The Court should first decide if any uncertainty as to what a
reasonable man would do exists; if the Court decides that there is
doubt, it should then permit the question to go to the jury. Such
uncertainty seems present in the instant case.
Thomas L. Hindes
CONsTiTuTiONAL LAw--CmiNAL PROCEDuRE-RiGHTr To COUNSEL ON
APPEAL.-Petitioner, who had been represented by appointed counsel
at his trial, requested that the trial court appoint counsel to perfect an
appeal. The record shows no response to this request, and no appeal
was taken. Petitioner then moved to vacate the sentence under Ky.
R. Crim. P. 11.42 [hereinafter referred to as RCr 11.42].' In over-
ruling this motion, the trial court recited that it had previously ap-
pointed two attorneys to make an appeal if they decided one would
be feasible. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion, which had
alleged substantive error. Held: Reversed. Hammershoy v. Common-
wealth, 398 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1966). An indigent's right to assistance
17 Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 82 A.2d 44 (1951).
'8 Id. at 311, 82 A.2d at 48.
19 Muck v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 41 Wash. 2d 81, 247
P.2d 233 (1952).
1 See note 8, infra, for the text of this rule.
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of counsel on appeal cannot be subject to a determination. by court-
appointed counsel that the appeal has merit, and if no appeal was
taken because a court-appointed attorney decided the appeal was
without merit, a motion to vacate judgment under RCr 11.42 is an ap-
propriate remedy.
Two decisions banded down shortly after Hammershoy have so
clouded this area of the law that a discussion of them becomes
necessary.
In the first, an inmate of Eddyville penitentiary brought a motion
under RCr 11.42, claiming he was denied an appeal and effective as-
sistance of counsel on appeal. This man alleged that his appointed
counsel had filed notice of appeal, but one hundred twenty-four days
later informed him that he believed the appeal was without merit.
The lower court denied a hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion and this
determination was appealed. Held: Affirmed. Benoit v. Common-
wealth, 402 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1966). On a RCr 11.42 motion, peti-
tioner's allegations that his attorney did not perfect an appeal, without
allegations that an appeal was requested, are not sufficient to vacate
the judgment.
In the second, another state penitentiary inmate brought a motion
to vacate under RCr 11.42, claiming that his "court-appointed counsel
"refused to appeal the case, or make a motion for a new trial."2 The
opinion does not state whether he alleged that he had requested an
appeal. Petitioner, without detailing specific allegations, made only a
general averment of grave error in the original trial. The lower court
denied a hearing on the motion to vacate. Held: Affirmed. Williams v.
Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1966). To reach a denial of
appeal and a denial of assistance of counsel on appeal, allegations
showing the potential success of an appeal are necessary.
The Substantive Right
If appeal from a criminal conviction may be taken of right, then an
indigent is entitled to assistance of counsel in making such an appeal. 3
The issue in these three cases becomes: Is it a denial of equal pro-
tection of the law when appointed counsel refuses to perfect an appeal
which he believes is without merit? Hammershoy indicates it is:
If we are correct in our interpretation of Douglas v. California ...
and Lane v. Brown ... the right of an indigent defendant in a criminal
case to the assistance of counsel on appeal, secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment, cannot be subjected to a determination by either a court
2405 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1966).
3 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); McIntosh v. Commonwealth,
368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963).
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or state-provided counsel that the grounds for appeal are "meritorious"
or "feasible."4
The opinion does not discuss how this "interpretation" was reached.
However, the writer of the Hammershoy opinion dissented strongly in
Williams, since he viewed the two Supreme Court cases as holding
"that the right to an appellate review, with counsel, does not depend
on the existence of meritorious grounds."5 If this interpretation of
Douglas v. California and Lane v. Brown is correct, appointed counsel
must perfect an appeal in every case where requested to do so,
regardless of his belief in the merits. The majority opinion in Wil-
liams interprets Douglas v. California as holding merely that whether
an indigent receives counsel on appeal cannot be left to the discretion
of a state agency.
Actually Douglas, limited to its facts, has a narrow holding: if a
non-indigent with his own attorney can obtain a full review as a mat-
ter of right, it is a denial of equal protection of the law to make the
appointment of counsel to assist an indigent on appeal depend on a
bare reading of the record. Although Hammershoy interpreted Douglas
as prescribing an absolute right of appeal, the Douglas Court itself
voiced approval of a federal procedure which provides: "An indigent
must be afforded counsel on appeal whenever he challenges a certi-
fication that the appeal is not taken in good faith."6 If good faith in the
appeal is required under Douglas, appointed counsel surely would not
be required to perfect an appeal which had no merit. Lane v. Brown,
7
cited in Hammershoy as likewise determinative, does not deal pri-
marily with counsel, but with the e.xistence of a right to appeal where
an indigent could not afford the expense of preparing a record.
The argument of the dissent notwithstanding, Williams does not
seem to conflict with Douglas. Moreover, even if the dissent in Wil-
liams should prove to be the correct interpretation of Douglas, much
of the confusion attending these cases would remain. The outcome of
the three cases depends as much on the procedural framework out of
which they arose as on their substantive facts.
The Procedural Background
Each case was an appeal from denial of a hearing on a motion to
vacate the judgment under RCr 11.42.8 This motion is a post-con-
4 398 S.W.2d 883, 884.
5405 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1966).
6 372 U.S. 353, 357.
7372 U.S. 477 (1963).8 This rule provides: "(1) A prisoner in custody under sentence who claims
a right to be released on the ground that the sentence is subject to collateral
(Continued on next page)
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viction remedy which replaces habeas corpus in certain situations. Ac-
cording to the plain language of the rule, it applies only where the
judgment is subject to collateral attack.
At first blush RCr 11.42 would seem inapplicable here, since the
issue was a failure to grant equal protection of the law in a proceeding
which took place after the judgment. The defendants were not at-
tacking the judgment collaterally, but were alleging that they had been
denied a right to appeal the judgment.
The Court in Hammershoy granted relief under such a motion,
relief which took the form of an order to the circuit court to appoint
counsel to perfect an appeal or vacate the judgment. The inappro-
priateness of this procedure is obvious, for if the judgment were void,
it should have been vacated unconditionally. In effect, an extension
of time to appeal was granted, but through a rather awkward ap-
proach.
What is the justification of this awkward approach? Hammershoy
says it is indicated by Lane.9 But in Lane, petitioner had unsuccessfully
carried the refusal of an appeal to the highest court of the state.
Against this background he brought a habeas corpus proceeding in the
federal courts. The Supreme Court held this total denial of appeal to
be a violation of equal protection of the law, so that the judgment
would be void unless the state could somehow grant him an appeal.
In short, declaring the judgment void conditionally was the only way
to attack the state court's determination.
In the instant case, however, petitioner, Hammershoy had a right
to appeal and a right to assistance of counsel on appeal, 0 but the time
in which to appeal had run. What he sought, and what he received,
was an extension of time in which to appeal, and the case had nothing
whatsoever to do with the vulnerability of the judgment itself to col-
lateral attack. Furthermore, he could also have attempted an appeal,
despite the running of the allotted period.
The two subsequent cases have not clarified this procedure at all.
In Benoit the Court simply put a tight procedural cap on the Ham-
mershoy rule. It required allegations that petitioner had requested
counsel to perfect an appeal. The facts in Benoit all but shout that
petitioner's failure to request an appeal occurred because he thought
his attorney was already making one. Nevertheless the Court required
a specific allegation of such a request. Williams added the require-
(Footnote continued from preeding age)
attack may at any time proceed directly by motion in the court vhich imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct it."
9 398 S.W.2d 883.
10 McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963).
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ment that allegations be made of substantial error such that an appeal
would have been of some benefit. The decision relied on Tipton v.
Commonwealth," a pre-Hammershoy case which said that failure of
appointed counsel to perfect an appeal could not be reached under
RCr 11.42, but "could under appropriate circumstances, become the
basis for an appeal which otherwise would have been foreclosed as
too late."' 2
The procedural confusion attending these cases could be dispelled
by the approach mentioned in Tipton. If the time for appeal has run
while an indigent is relying on appointed counsel to bring an appeal,
and counsel did not bring an appeal because he felt it was without
merit, then allow a late appeal to be made. The indigent could peti-
tion the sentencing court for a record and appointed counsel; if the
court refused to grant them because time had run, he could seek
mandamus from the Court of Appeals to force the trial court to grant
him such assistance. Then, or after perfection of the appeal, if the
Commonwealth argues that time for appeal has run, he could claim
special facts justifying the late appeal. This would be more direct and
sensible than the present, uncertain back-door approach to obtaining
an extension of time in which to appeal.
Laura L. Murrell
CONSTrT~rIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-CIIxnqAL
PROSECUrIoN OF A CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC FOR PuiUc DRuNKENEss.-Joe
B. Driver, 59, was arrested and sentenced for public drunkenness.
Driver's first conviction for public intoxication occurred at the age of
twenty-four, and he had been convicted of this same offense more
than 200 times. The state court held that imposition of the sentence
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though de-
fendant was allegedly an alcoholic.' A petition for habeas corpus was
denied in federal district court even though Driver was found to be a
chronic alcoholic.2 From this denial, defendant appealed. Held:
Reversed. The public appearance of a chronic alcoholic while in-
toxicated is a compulsive act symptomatic of the disease of chronic
alcoholism, and to criminally punish one for such conduct is cruel and
unusual punishment. Driver v. Hinnant, 856 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
A general rule of the common law, and one usually followed under
11393 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1966).
12 Id. at 495.
1 State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
"Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
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